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ABSTRACT
Can improved environmental testing prevent on-orbit component failures such as those
experienced in the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) constellation? TDRS
communications have been available to user spacecraft continuously for over 11 years, during
which the five TDRSs placed in orbit have demonstrated their redundancies and robustness by
surviving 26 component failures. Nevertheless, additional environmental testing prior to launch
could prevent the occurrence of some types of failures, and could help to maintain
communication services. Specific testing challenges involve traveling wave tube assemblies
(TWTAs) whose lives may decrease with on-off cycling, and heaters that are subject to thermal
cycles. The development of test conditions and procedures should account for known thermal
variations. Testing may also have the potential to prevent failures in which components such as
diplexers have had their lives dramatically shortened because of particle migration in a
weightless environment. Reliability modeling could be used to select additional components that
could benefit from special testing, but experience shows that this approach has serious
limitations. Through knowledge of on-orbit experience, and with advances in testing,
communication satellite programs might avoid the occurrence of some types of failures, and
extend future spacecraft longevity beyond the current TDRS design life of ten years. However,
determining which components to test, and how much testing to do, remain problematical.
INTRODUCTION
The NASA Space Network
The NASA Space Network includes five geostationary TDRSs controlled by ground
terminals located primarily at White Sands, New Mexico. The TDRSs, from their high orbits, can
view almost the entire surface of Earth. Each TDRS relays commands from a ground terminal to
user spacecraft in low earth orbit (LEO). Each TDRS also relays data and telemetry from user
spacecraft to the ground terminal. User spacecraft benefit from the Space Network's ability to
communicate between fixed ground facilities and rapidly-moving spacecraft at almost any time,
and at almost any location in LEO. Some examples of user spacecraft are included in Table 1.
*Work performed by The MITRE Corporation for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Goddard Space Flight Center, Code 405 under Contract NAS5-32607.
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Table 1. Examples of TDRS User Spacecraft
Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF)
Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE)
Earth Observing System (EOS)
Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS)
Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE)
Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO)
Hubbell Space Telescope (HST)
Landsats (LSATs)
Ocean Topography Experiment (TOPEX)
Space Shuttle Orbiters Atlantis, Columbia,
Discovery, and Endeavour
Space Station Alpha (SSA)
Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission (TRMM)
Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite (UARS)
X-Ray Timing Explorer (XTE)
Replenishment and Reliability
To ensure the continuity of Space Network services, NASA monitors the state of health of
the TDRSs, plans for changes in user requirements, and replaces or supplements TDRSs as
necessary. Constellation replenishment planning depends on accurate estimates of TDRS lives.
TDRS lives are predicted by reliability models. These models perform Monte Carlo simulations
of the failures of all components except those already known to have failed. In most cases, a
TDRS has a primary and a back-up component for each required function. Thus, most
component failures do not prevent a TDRS from performing its mission. A partial or complete
communication failure occurs only if both a primary component and its back-up components fail.
COMPONENT FAILURE HISTORY
Predicted Failures
Failure predictions are based on the "parts count" method and a constant failure rate for
each class of part in operation, i.e., whose failure would be observable from the relayed data or
from telemetry. Predictions are made using random or pseudo-random number generators to
reflect the uncertainty of future events - even though the events may ultimately be physically
explainable and thus non-random. Predicted failure rates are based on MIL-HDBK 217D (ref. 1).
The "reliability drivers" are the components that most significantly affect the reliability of a
TDRS's communication service, based on their predicted failure rates considered in combination
with their duty cycles and the availability of back-up components. These reliability drivers are
listed in Table 2.
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Table2. TDRS Reliability Drivers
  zoJle t
Decrypter
Return Processor
Tr&c Transponder
Encrypter
Forward Processor
Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier Assemblies
Master Frequency Generator
Multiple Access Transmitter
Multiple Access Receiver
Ku-Band Receivers
Solar Array Drive Assembly
Telemetry Unit
Thruster Module
Wheel Drive Assembly
All Others
All
Ten-Year Reliabili _ty
0.81
0.89
0.93
0.94
0.94
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.91
0.42
The total predicted component failure rate of 1.10 per TDRS per year is constant for any
TDRS except for the usually minor decreases that occur after a primary component and its back-
up both fail, or if there is a single-point failure (one with no design back-up). TDRS 6's predicted
failure rate is slightly lower than the rate for the earlier TDRSs because of the substitution of
higher-reliability low noise amplifiers for the previously used parametric amplifiers in the single-
access return telecommunication chains (ref. 2). The TDRS 7 failure rate will be even lower
because its single-access services will use solid state power amplifiers (SSPAs) instead of TWTAs
(ref. 3).
The total predicted failure rate of the TDRS constellation is approximately proportional to
the number of TDRSs on orbit. Therefore, the total predicted failure rate for the constellation
increased with each successfully launched TDRS. Depending on the future survival and
operation of older TDRSs, the total predicted failure rate of the constellation may continue to
increase. The TDRS launch dates and current ages are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. TDRS Launch Dates and Ages (as of July 1,1994)
TDRS 1 April 4, 1983 11.24
TDRS 2 January 1985 Launch failed
TDRS 3 September 29, 1988 5.75
TDRS 4 March 13, 1989 5.30
TDRS 5 August 2, 1991 2.91
TDRS 6 January 13, 1993 1.46
TDRS 7 June 29, 1995 (planned) Unlaunched
TDRS 8, 9, and 10 Unscheduled Unlaunched
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Observed Failures
The component failures considered in this paper include those that appear to reflect
imperfections in the design, manufacturing, or operation of a TDRS in the space environment,
and that would be expected to significantly and irreversibly impair TDRS communication service
in the absence of back-ups or a prior failure of the service. The failures on TDRS 1 of the primary
thruster bank and the back-up negative roll thruster, which appear to have resulted from
problems at launch with the booster rocket, and the failure of TDRS 2 to be carried into orbit by
Challenger, are not counted for the purposes of this paper. Also not counted are failures that
would affect the non-Space Network equipment on board, which is neither modeled nor fully
monitored.
A TDRS can be neither inspected in orbit nor returned to earth for study. The state of
health of a TDRS is surmised based on telemetry and the quality of communication services. The
compilation of a component failure list is subjective, and opinions about whether a component
has failed, and when it failed, may differ. More than one hundred Spacecraft Orbital Anomaly
Reports (SOARs) document events that are not considered to be failures as defined in this paper,
and it is possible and perhaps likely that some component failures have not been detected. Also,
the attribution of a failure to a specific component may differ depending on whether the
component caused the failure or was affected by the failure. In this paper, the affected
component, which appears to have its function impaired or absent, is the one that is named. The
cause of the failure is often less certain. The failures are listed in Table 4.
Date
07-17-83
10-19-83
10-28-83
11-01-83
04-15-85
06-27-85
04-02-86
11-28-86
00-08-87
08-11-87
03-14-89
07-05-89
00-30-89
09-28-89
11-11-89
01-16-90
04 -03-90
08-07-90
04-09-91
07-05-91
09-04-91
04-03-92
05-29-92
01-13-93
08-31-93
05-29-94
Table 4. TDRS Component Failure History
Component Description TDRS _ SOAR
Gyro (# 1/2) 1 0.28 1
Diplexer, Ku-Band Forward East 1 0.54 7
TWTA, Ku-Band East ,Primary 1 0.57 7
TWTA, Ku-Band West, Primary 1 0.58 8
TWTA, Ku-Band Downlink, Primary (#5) 1 2.03 43
Indicator, East Pitch, Primary 1 2.23 55
Heater (at parametric amplifier), East, Primary 1 3.00 61
Diplexer, S-Band Forward East 1 3.65 64
TWTA, S-Band East, Primary 1 4.34 67
TWTA, S-Band East, Redundant 1 4.35 68
Indicator, West Pitch, Primary 4 0.00 86
Phased Array Receiver, S-Band, Primary (#10) 1 6.25 93
Synthesizer, S-Band Return East, Primary 1 6.41 96
Indicator, East Pitch, Redundant 1 6.49 97
TWTA, Ku-Band Downlink, Primary (#4) 1 6.61 95
Switch, West Polarization 3 1.30 100
TWTA, Ku-Band East, Redundant 1 7.00 102
Indicator, West Pitch, Redundant 4 1.40 108
Earth Sensor Electronics, Primary 4 2.07 111
Master Frequency Generator, 955 MHz, Primary 4 2.31 115
Processor (?), S-Band Return East, Primary 1 8.42 119
TWTA, Ku-Band West, Redundant 1 9.00 125
Heater (at parametric amplifier), East, Primary 4 3.21 131
Thermistor (on solar array) 6 0.00 138
TWTA, Ku-Band Downlink, Redundant (#6) 1 10.41 122
TWTA, S-Band East, Primary 5 2.82 161
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The reader will notice that 18 of the 26 failures have occurred on TDRS 1 during its 11 years of
service. Only one failure has occurred on the almost six-year-old TDRS 3. With five failures in its
five years, TDRS 4 has an average history. TDRS 5 has had only one failure in almost three years,
and TDRS 6 has one failure in a year and a half.
TDRS 1 failures are dominant, leading most program personnel to conclude that
subsequent improvements in design, manufacturing, and testing have markedly lowered the
failure rates of the later TDRSs. However, the data base is not sufficient to justify such a
conclusion on a purely statistical basis. The ages of the components when they failed are neither
predominantly low, indicative of "infant mortality," nor predominantly high, indicative of
burnout or wearout, but are distributed more or less evenly. Most of the failures are attributed to
design errors, manufacturing defects, and unknown but often recurring conditions, with few if
any being random events.
Observations Versus Predictions
A historical comparison of the numbers of predicted and observed TDRS component
failures is shown in Figure 1. Since the prediction is an expected value, it increases smoothly,
while the observations can occur as only discrete integral values. The 95% upper and lower
confidence limits are calculated above and below the predictions, based on binomial probabilities,
to delineate a confidence zone.
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Figure 1. TDRS Component Failures to July 1,1994
The observations tend to exceed predictions early in the program because many
component failures occurred on the first TDRS. Recently, the observations fell behind predictions
because of the better performance of the later TDRSs. Overall, the entire history of the TDRS 1
through TDRS 6 procurement appears to agree with predictions as well as can be expected.
Future observations may fall further behind predictions. However, this trend could be halted by
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eitherprematureburnoutor wearoutonTDRS1 throughTDRS6,or failuresof newdesign
featuresor partlotsusedbeginningwithTDRS7.
Theobservedagreementisnotentirelyfortuitous.Three different sets of failure rates
have been compiled for the TDRS design. The earliest set, based on MIL-HDBK 217B, included
relatively high failure rates, and was replaced by MIL-HDBK 217D rates (refs. 4 and 5). The
latter were considered to be a priori more appropriate, based on spacecraft experience in general
but not on TDRS experience, which was then very limited and not yet fully compiled and
analyzed. When the even lower MIL-HDBK 217E Notice 1 rates became available, they were
found to under-predict historical TDRS failures, and thus they were not adopted for use in
reliability and replenishment modeling (ref. 6). The most recently tabulated failure rates, in MIL-
HDBK 217F Notice 1, have not been applied to the TDRS design, but could have been if a change
to the new rates had been deemed necessary (ref. 7). In short, MIL-HDBK 217D failure rates have
been used because they are consistent with total component failure experience.
For individual categories of components, observations do not mirror predictions. For
example, the total predicted failure rate of 1.10 components per year is the sum of the rates for the
TDRS bus and payload. The bus includes subsystems such as attitude control, electric power,
propulsion, tracking, telemetry, and command (TI'&C), and thermal control for these subsystems,
with a total predicted failure rate of 0.44 components per year. The telecommunications payload
has a total predicted failure rate of 0.66 components per year. However, only three of the 26
components failed to date are in the bus (viz., a gyro, an earth sensor, and a solar array
thermistor). The reason for the better reliability of the TDRS bus is believed to be that its design
was previously developed, tested, and improved by the Navy's FLTSATCOM program, while the
TDRS payload design represented an extension of existing technology. Thus, new designs may
merit more testing than proven designs.
TRAVELING WAVE TUBE ASSEMBLIES
Traveling Wave Tube Assembly Failures
Ten TWTAs have failed, including six (four Ku-band and two S-band) east and west
TWTAs on TDRS 1, three Ku-band downlink TWTAs (the third having been turned on after the
first one failed) also on TDRS 1, and one Ku-band east TWTA on TDRS 5. The design of the
TWTAs used on TDRS 1 was defective, resulting in heat-induced stress failures. After the early
TWTA failures on TDRS 1, the design of the TWTAs used on the later TDRSs was improved. Of
course, TWTA failures continued to occur on TDRS 1.
Three of the TWTA failures occurred after operating times of less than 0.6 years, and may
be considered to be examples of "infant mortality." Three of the failures, including the one on
TDRS 5, occurred after operating times of about two to four years, and may be thought of as mid-
life failures. The remaining five failures occurred after operating times of between six and nine
years, and may be burnout failures.
Although TWTAs have been recognized from the beginning as being among TDRS life-
limiting components, the TWTA failure history of TDRS 1 is obviously unsatisfactory. On the
other four satellites, each with six operating TWTAs, the expected number of failures according to
the average MIL-HDBK 217D rate of 2.0 per million hours is 1.4. Thus, the failure of a TWTA on
TDRS 5 is consistent with the predicted rate. Since all TWTAs have back-ups, TDRS 5
communication service has not been affected.
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Traveling Wave Tube Assembly Testing
The TWTA failure experience on TDRS 1 might have been prevented by improved
testing. Extended bum-in prior to launch might have prevented some of the "infant mortality"
failures, but might have also reduced remaining TWTA life, thereby resulting in additional
burnout failures. Therefore, extended burn-in of non-flight TWTA prototypes appears to be a
better method of testing TWTA design and workmanship.
Some analysts have expressed concerns about limited TWTA cycle life. Although
TWTAs remain on continuously under normal circumstances, the S-band TWTAs cycle when a
TDRS experiences a loss of signal from the ground terminal, followed by a pre-programmed
Emergency Time-Out (ETO). In addition, solar array disorientation can lead to a low-voltage
cutoff of K-band TWTAs. Power cycling of non-flight TWTA prototypes could help to ensure
adequate cycle life. (Also, a better definition of cycle life could lead to design and operational
changes that conserve power by routinely cycling TWTAs in accordance with communication
service schedules.)
Accelerated life testing could be performed with ambient temperatures and applied
voltages that are more stressful than on-orbit operating conditions. This approach could have
offered a very high likelihood of detecting design or manufacturing flaws resulting in "infant
mortality," and a reasonable likelihood of detecting flaws leading to premature burnout. The
accelerated life testing could incorporate both extended burn-in and power cycling.
DIPLEXERS
Diplexer Failures
Two diplexers have failed, one operating in the Ku-band and one in the S-band, but both
connected to the east antenna of TDRS 1. The cause of these failures is believed to be short
circuiting due to the presence of metallic particle contamination in the gaps between tuning
screws and tuning cavity walls. Manufacturing improvements made after the TDRS 1 diplexer
failures seem to have prevented similar failures on the other TDRSs.
The TDRS diplexer history is not satisfactory, especially because the diplexers are not
redundant, and the failures disable the transmission of signals from the antennas. Of the two
west diplexers remaining on TDRS 1, and the four east and west diplexers on each of the other
four TDRSs, the expected number of additional failures at the MIL-HDBK 217D rate of 25.7 per
billion hours is 0.02. The actual diplexer failure rate appears to have been considerably greater
than the prediction.
Diplexer Testing
If the hypothesized cause of diplexer failure, weightless migration of metal particles, is
correct, then no amount of ordinary testing on earth would have revealed the problem. Only in
the weightlessness of orbit would the particles have floated away from the diplexer walls and
created short circuits. Testing in a weightless environment would not be practical. Perhaps
functional testing accompanied by rotation or vibration to mobilize contaminating particles
would be useful to simulate some of the effects of weightlessness. However, in the case of the
failed diplexers, a simpler solution than improved functional testing appears to be ensuring the
adequacy of tuning gaps and maintaining and verifying cleanliness through all stages of
manufacturing.
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HEATERS
Heater Failures
Two TDRS heaters have failed, and both are located near east parametric amplifiers on
the three-year-old satellites TDRS 1 and TDRS 4. The first failure, on TDRS 1, was attributed to a
design flaw in which the heater was placed too close to its controlling thermostat, resulting in
excessive cycling. The design basis was 1(30,000 cycles, and the failure occurred after 525,000
cycles. The later TDRSs were modified to avoid this problem. Nevertheless, a second failure
occurred, this time on TDRS 4. Since each TDRS has back-up heaters, and other back-up
components that could be powered if more heat were needed, heater failures are very unlikely to
threaten the TDRS mission.
Heater Testing
Heater failures resulting from a flawed design with excessive cycling might have been
avoided if heater performance and cycling were monitored during thermal-vacuum testing or
other thermal environment simulation, for later comparison to design data. During a simulation
of the thermal environment, it might be necessary to include conditions representative of a TDRS
in sunlight (in different orientations) or in eclipse, with its various "hot" payload components
powered or off, and with its thermal control material properties (e.g., absorptivities, reflectivities,
conductivities, and heat capacities) represented as new or after aging. In this way, any condition
that might result in excessive heater cycling might be discovered.
ANTENNA POINTING INDICATORS
Antenna Pointing Indicator Failures
After TWTAs, the components that have failed most often are parts of the gimbal drive
electronics (GDE) used to read antenna positions. These parts are called null indicators. They
are hermetically sealed, magnetically activated, mechanical switches with pin connectors and
wiring. Their switching cycles are counted to determine the pitch (east-west) and roll (north-
south) pointing positions of the east, west, and ground link antennas. Thus, there are six primary
null indicators per TDRS, and each of these is accompanied by a back-up indicator. Another type
of back-up exists in the form of ground station software that counts antenna movement
commands to estimate pointing positions.
Null indicator failures were not predicted to be highly likely. The MIL-HDBK 217D
failure rate of each indicator is very low, only a fraction of the 203 per billion hour failure rate of
each GDE module. The expected number of GDE failures is 0.3, only a fraction of which would
be null indicator failures.
Four null indicators have failed. All four failures affect pitch rather than roll indicators.
Two of the failures are in the primary and back-up null indicators of the east antenna drive of
TDRS 1. The other two failures are in the primary and back-up null indicators of the west
antenna drive of TDRS 4. The times in service of the failed indicators were 0.00, 1.40, 2.23, and
6.49 years. The occurrence of the four failures in two primary/back-up pairs is remarkable for its
random probability, based on the TDRS age distribution, of about 0.02. However, the pairings
are unexplained, and convincing explanations of the failures are lacking.
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AntennaPointingIndicatorTesting
Theapparentlyhighrate of defects in the null indicators makes them good candidates for
improved testing. On the other hand, the absence of an understanding of the cause of failure
makes test specification problematical. The occurrence of the failures in primary/back-up pairs
seems to indicate that the cause of the failures is in the design or environment of the switch pair,
not internal to the switches. Thus far, ground testing of similar null switches under conditions
somewhat representative of on-orbit operations has not resulted in a failure.
Test environment modifications that might appear to offer some possibility of
reproducing the on-orbit failures include testing with thermal cycling, ionizing radiation, and, as
in the case of the diplexers discussed above, rotation or vibration. Accelerated life testing of
prototype null indicators, in which pertinent environmental factors are exaggerated, might also
prove to be useful.
GYRO
Gyro Failure
The four TDRS 1 gyros were operated extensively to recover from a booster rocket failure
during launch. One gyro failed three months later. Although each gyro exceeded its estimated
1500-hour design life by 1200 hours, the failure is counted in accordance with the criteria of this
paper. Since each of the other three gyros continues to operate far beyond the design life (with
current accumulated times in operation averaging 3900 hours), the failed gyro was probably
defective rather than worn out.
The possibility remains that this failure at least in part is attributable to the failure of the
booster rocket, not to TDRS 1 itself. However, this consideration is offset by the possibility that
the uncounted thruster failures may not be entirely attributable to the booster rocket failure. In
any case, since the very early gyro failure, no failures have occurred among either the three
remaining gyros on TDRS 1 or any of the four gyros (some of which have logged almost 2000
operating hours) on each of the other four TDRSs in orbit.
Gyro Testing
Any recommendation for additional gyro testing should account for gyro failure history.
The TDRS gyro history is excellent, especially because each TDRS's long-term mission requires
only one gyro. At the MIL-HDBK 217D failure rate of 2.06 per million hours, in the 26.3 TDRS-
years of experience the expected number of additional failures is nine gyros, or an average of two
per TDRS. Since none of these failures have occurred, the actual failure rate appears to be
considerably lower. On the basis of on this experience, no additional testing of gyros is
recommended.
OTHER COMPONENTS
Other Failures
The other TDRS components that have failed include the following:
Phased array receiver, S-band, primary (#10) on TDRS 1 at an age of six years (cause
unknown)
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Synthesizer, S-band return east, primary, on TDRS 1 at an age of six years (cause
unknown)
West polarization switch stuck on TDRS 3 at an age of one year (caused by a short
circuit, possibly related to thermal cycling, with insulation shrinkage and exposure of
underlying wire)
Earth sensor electronics (ESE), primary, on TDRS 4 at an age of two years (cause
unknown)
Master frequency generator (MFG), 955 megahertz output, primary lost on TDRS 4 at an
age of two years (cause unknown)
Processor, S-band return east, primary (or possibly frequency synthesizer, S-band retum
east, back-up) on TDRS 1 at an age of eight years (cause unknown)
Thermistor on solar array of TDRS 6 during launch or deployment (caused by de-
bonding)
The MIL-HDBK failure rates of these components are neither remarkably high nor low. The
failures appear to be isolated and individually unpredictable events whose further description
would not be useful here.
Unfailed Component Types
All other components are unfailed. Interestingly, these include the TT&C transponders,
encrypters, and decrypters, which are predicted to be TDRS reliability drivers. At the MIL-HDBK
217D failure rate of 14.5 per million hours, the total number of expected failures is 3.34. The
probability of no failures when 3.34 are expected is 0.0354. Perhaps the unexpectedly good
experience with the TT&C subsystem is attributable to its extensive early development, testing,
and pre-launch operation.
Other Component Testing
The predicted failure rates of other components do not appear to be particularly useful
for planning a testing program. No additional testing of these components is recomme_nded.
CONCLUSIONS
The overall TDRS component failure history is consistent with high quality in design and
workmanship, and with the total predicted failure rate from MIL-HDBK 217D. The philosophy
of extensive redundancy combined with pre-launch performance and thermal-vacuum testing
has been sufficient to ensure the continuous long-term availability of Space Network
communication service.
Specific failures do not appear to have been predictable using MIL-HDBK methods. The
types of components predicted to fail have not been the same as those that actually failed.
Subsystems with extensive heritage have been much more reliable than predicted. Some new
and modified payload components on TDRS 1 have been less reliable than predicted. However,
the TDRS 1 failures led to design and manufacturing improvements on later TDRSs, whose
reliabilities have been much better.
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The principal components with an unsatisfactory failure history are the TWTAs on TDRS
1. These TWTAs have appeared to be subject to design error, resulting in both "infant mortality"
and premature burnout. Their failures on orbit might have been avoided through sufficient
accelerated life testing of prototypes, with both extended burn-in and power cycling. Without
this testing, TDRS 1 failures had to occur before the TWTAs on later TDRSs could be targeted for
improvement. The reliability of the improved TWTAs has been satisfactory.
The diplexer failure history presents an interesting testing challenge in which the
migration of contaminating metallic particles in a weightless environment would need to be
simulated. One approach could be the imposition of rotation or vibration during testing.
Accelerated life testing, rotation, or vibration might also be applied beneficially to
antenna pointing indicators in order to determine the cause of their failures.
In the case of heaters, an accurate simulation of variations in on-orbit thermal conditions
accompanied by monitoring of cycling rates might have prevented failures.
The TDRS reliability history appears to confirm the long-held view that additional testing
can prevent on-orbit failures. Testing is particularly important for new and modified systems,
subsystems, and components. From the failures experienced, it seems that accelerated life testing
of prototypes including extended burn-in, cycling of applied power and ambient temperature,
and rotation or vibration should receive especially strong consideration during the development
of new spacecraft. However, identifying the types of components that merit more testing, and
quantifying test conditions and durations so that they are consistent with procurement budgets
and schedules, remain as major problems.
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